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ABSTRACT
The rapid development of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is the significant incentive to contribute
in the vulnerable applications such as cognitive radio (CR). This paper proposes a Stackelberg game
approach to enhance the WSN-based CR security against the spectrum sensing data falsification
(SSDF) attack and conserve the consequent lost power consumption. The attack aims to corrupt the
spectrum decision by imposing interference power to the delivered reports from the sensor nodes
(SNs) to the fusion center (FC) to make a protection level below a specific threshold. The proposed
model utilizes the intelligent Stackelberg game features along with the matched filter (MF) to max-
imize the number of protected reports sent by the SNs to the FC leading to accurate decision of
the spectrum status. Furthermore, the TDMA protocol is utilized to resolve the complexity of em-
ploying MF for the spectrum detection to avoid the collision between the delivered reports. The
proposed model aims to enhance the number of correctly received reports at the FC, and hence man-
age the lost energy of reports retransmission due to the malicious attack effect. Moreover, the model
can conserve the lost power of the failure communication attempts due to the SSDF attack impact.
Simulation results indicate the improved performance of the proposed protection model along with
the MF over the six different environments against the SSDF attack as compared to two defense
schemes, namely, random and equal weight defense strategies.
KeywordsWireless Sensor Networks, Cognitive Radio, Game Theory, Threats Mitigation, Power Conservation.
1 Introduction
With the dramatic lack of spectrum resources, the intelligent communication methodologies have flourished such as
cognitive radio (CR) to resolve this issue. In the literature context, the spectrum quality-of-service (QoS) management,
energy conservation for which the packet size optimizationwas one of the key roles, and security mitigation rise among
most of the exerted efforts. Various CR paradigms were studied focusing on the spectrum utilization depending on
the statistical QoS to support the real-time applications at the secondary users (SUs) [1–6]. Moreover, the SUs are
used to support the primary feedback information to setup a primary user (PU)-aware routing technique exploiting
the compressive sensing to gain the sparse nature of the PUs occupation [7, 8]. The packet size optimization has
also introduced a valuable solution for prolonging network lifetime [9]. Different CR spectrum detectors have been
evolved, most known of which: Energy, cyclostationary, and matched filter (MF) detectors [10–12]. MF was not only
limited for CR applications but its use has been extended to blood vessel detection [13–16]. Indeed, CR opens a wide
technological gate for many competitive networks to cooperate with for enhancing the day-to-day challenges such as
security front and power consumption management.
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In this regard, secured WSNs can dramatically contribute in CR networks (CRNs) as the fusion center (FC) needs
to rely on distributed sensor nodes (SNs) to sense the spectrum status. In other words, WSNs suffer from security
and power management problems specially in harsh environments. The uncontrolled WSNs security is a double
defect: one is data deterioration and second is losing power consumption in transmission of designated infected data.
Consequently, security in WSNs-based CR is a prominent issue that has been considered in [8, 17–21].
One of the eminent techniques utilized in the literature to handle the security problem inWSNs is game theory [22–26].
Game theory is a special optimization branch which tackles the interaction among a set of rational intelligent users
that aim to enhance their individual gains in an intelligent and adaptive way [27]. To this end, three main dependent
challenges affecting a smooth operation for CR are spectrum sensing, mitigating security threats, and the consequent
lost energy. One of the security threats in CRNs is spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack [28]. Here, the
defender represents the FC. Therefore, the whole communication system in such CRN can be strictly disrupted and
the network performance will be steeply degraded. In addition, this attack can disrupt the delivered reports at the FC,
and hence, a wrong decision will be taken by the FC about the spectrum status. Moreover, it does not only reduce the
number of correctly received reports (packets) at the FC but also enlarge the energy lost. Since the amount of energy
to protect the allotted SNs is limited, an intelligent SNs protection mechanism is needed to minimize the amount of
invested power.
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach using Stackelberg game along with MF detector to enhance
WSNs-based CR security against the SSDF attack. To the best of our knowledge, no similar work has been presented
in the literature which uses game theory along with MF to improve the detection performance of PU, handling the
security threat, manage the consequent lost energy, and enhance the correctly delivered reports to be processed at the
FC by which the decision is taken.
The main contributions of the paper are three folds:
• The Stackelberg game model is designed along with MF detector to optimally detect the infected spectrum
status reports, due to the rational external SSDF attack, transmitted from the deployed SNs. To decrease
the complexity of employing the MF for spectrum detection, we utilize TDMA protocol to avoid collision
between the delivered SNs reports to the FC. Moreover, TDMA is used to support a robust synchronization
between the FC and the deployed SNs, which facilitates the detection and protection process.
• For adopting a realistic paradigm, the proposed model considers the potential hardware (HW) failure oc-
curred in the deployed SNs and can distinguishes these nodes among the ones influenced by the attack, while
attaining improved performance with the presence of the SNs malfunction.
• The proposed model effectiveness is clarified by the achieved probability detection performance in presence
of SSDF attack and HW failure. This achievement is denoted by the percentage of protected SNs reports. In
other words, the more protected SNs reports are, the more accurate decision is taken by the FC. Hence, the
model can conserve the lost power of reports (packets) retransmission as a result of failure communication
attempts due to the SSDF attack impact. The effectiveness of the above proposed approach is verified through
simulation evaluation over six different environments, outdoor line-of-sight (OL), outdoor non-line-of-sight
(ON), underground line-of-sight (UL), underground non-line-of-sight (UN), indoor line-of-sight (IL), and
indoor non-line-of-sight (IN).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. In Section 3, the system model is
discussed. The proposed game formulation is then presented in Section 4, while the SNs reports delivery is addressed
in Section 5. Section 6 shows the obtained results. Finally, the paper conclusion is revealed in Section 7.
2 Related Work
This section discusses the related works to enhance the CRNs performance including the security aspect. In the
literature context, the security in CR can be the essential metric to guarantee the data privacy and to achieve robust
communication system, specifically against the intelligent attacks manipulations such as eavesdropper, primary user
emulation (PUE), jamming, byzantine, and SSDF attacks [29]. As an eminent adaptive and intelligent tool to address
the above security aspects, game theory can be utilized in CRN [30–35].
The eavesdropper and jamming attacks effect on CRNs, which recognizes the CRN data privacy, were effectively stud-
ied using Stackelberg game, zero-sum game, repeated game [30–32]. The problem of a full-duplex active eavesdropper,
which represents full duplex mode of a jammer and a classical eavesdropper, has been mitigated by a three stage Stack-
elberg game [30]. Similarly, the potential eavesdropper in CRN has been confronted by a zero-sum game [31]. A
repeated game was also utilized to build a multiple-channels communications secuity mechanism for SUs against the
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random eavesdroppers. The efforts of game theory was also extended to confront the PUE attack in CRN to minimize
the miss detection using a nonzero-sum game model [33]. Game theory was exploited to formulate the anti-jamming
channel selection problem as an anti-jamming dynamic game in CRN [34]. In [35], a zero-sum game was developed
to model the corrupted nodes due to the Byzantine attack, which negatively influences the the CRN routing reputation.
The harmful impact is caused by the SSDF attack on the FC decision. Nevertheless, only a few works were presented
to resolve this devastating issue in the CRNs.
In [24], a Stackelberg game was utilized in order to mitigate the SSDF attack to detect the corrupted nodes reports
in WSNs-based CR. Meanwhile, in [36], the problem of fake inspections sent by malicious SUs in CRNs due to the
SSDF was studied using static game approach to establish a statistical trust model. In [24, 36], the energy detection
method has been employed with game theory to detect the malicious nodes behavior due to the SSDF attack. The
energy detection is the simplest method of detection in CR but has crucial weaknesses, e.g., it can be deceived by the
intellectual attack manipulations and cannot reach the optimal detection. To solve this issue, more intelligent game
model needs to be designed along with a robust detection scheme against the SSDF attack.
Unlike the previous related works, this paper presents an effective game model designed with the MF detector and
TDMA based protocol to achieve an optimal solution against the security issue due to the SSDF attack under existence
of a possibility of HW failure. In addition, the model is utilized to manage the consequent lost energy over the six
different environments, where Tmote Sky based SN model [37] is used to assume a realistic CRN system.
3 System model
The proposed model is considered in Fig. 1. Notations and variables related to the proposed model and its mathemati-
cal representation are summarized in Table 1. The FC relies on |N | SNs that are utilized to identify the spectrum holes.
The SNs send the sensed spectrum as reports to the FC as shown in Fig. 1. Using this sequence, we aim to provide
a collision free of spectrum access to the secondary users (SUs) based on the delivered protected SNs reports to the
FC against the SSDF attack. We assume that the SSDF attack aims to devastate the communications between the SNs
and the FC in WSNs-based CR over statics AWGN channel, i.e., all SNs are symmetrically distributed around the FC,
where the distances between FC and all SNs are the same.
Figure 1 indicates the system structure of the proposed model for protecting the i-th SN report (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |N |})
from the impact of SSDF attack. The distributed defense budgets (xi)s on the SNs reports by the FC are used to
countermeasure the attack budgets (yi)s. Indeed, the defense and attack budgets can represent the amount of power
invested in the defense and attack actions, respectively. More particularly, the attack budget (yi) is exploited as
interference signal power, noise added to the original signal (report), to corrupt the transmitted reports from each
SN to the FC. Therefore, we consider that the SSDF deteriorates the SNR by injecting noise power. The reports
transmission from SNs to FC is organized based on TDMA to prevent the collision problem.
On the other hand, the FC defense budgets represent the desired transmission power of each SN to neglect the SSDF
attack impact and hence the performance is examined at the equilibrium point. The allotted defense budgets are
represented by the green arrows to countermeasure the SSDF attack effect. The red icon is the external attacker that
applies the attack budgets represented by the green arrows to disrupt the communication between the SNs and FC.
To this point, in the next section, we propose a Stackelberg game to model this interaction between the FC and the
external attacker, which represents the leader/follower nature of the problem; the FC acts as the leader and the attacker
acts as a follower. It should be noted that the attacker actions will be affected by the actions taken by the FC. Then, the
defense budget can be utilized as an internal self-defense mechanism to protect the delivered reports from the potential
corruption due to the rational SSDF attack manipulations.
Figure 2 shows the system structure along with the MF. It is clearly noted that the process starts by the deployed SNs
to sense the spectrum followed by BPF. The external attacker intervenes aiming at disrupting the designated delivered
report to FC at this stage. The FC is in charge of taking a decision about being the PU is present or absent. This
decision is based on the combined SNs reports passed the thresholding level.
The final decision is represented by a binary hypothesis testing problem. The two hypotheses in Eq. (1) are given in
presence of noise (H0) or noise plus signal (H1) taking into account the interference noise power added by the attack
where we assume that all SNs have the same noise floor.
H0 : yi(n) = CGi.s(n), PU absent
H1 : yi(n) = CGi.s(n) + wi(n), PU present
(1)
where yi(n) is the SN received signal, CG is the complex channel gain of the sensing channel, s(n) is the PU signal,
w(n) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance σ2i ,n = 1, 2, ..., Nsm, Nsm is the
sample number, i = 1, 2, ..., |N |.
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Figure 1: WSNs-based CR basic structure.
The optimal filter that projects the received signal in the direction of the pilot xp [38] can be written as follows:
ci =
Nsm∑
n=1
yi(n)x
∗
p(n). (2)
Using the Neyman-Pearson (NP) detector, it is well known that differentiating between the two hypothesis (H1/H0)
is based on the test statistics (ci) [14] using a threshold λi as follows.
ci
H1
>
<
H0
λi, i = 1, 2, ..., |N |. (3)
Accordingly, the probability of detection P id and the probability of false alarm P
i
f at i-th SN are already influenced by
the attack interference power, and can be given by
Pid = Pr(ci > λi|H1) = Q
(
λi − E√
Eσ2i
)
. (4)
Pif = Pr(ci > λi|H0) = Q
(
λi√
Eσ2i
)
, (5)
whereQ(·) is a function that provides the tail probability of the standard normal distribution at i-th SN. The threshold
level of every i-th report depends on the power level captured by each. E is the PU signal energy. Hereafter, we omit
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Figure 2: Game process along with MF detector with the presence of the attack.
superscript i for simplicity of notation. The sensing threshold (λ) is a function of PU signal energy and noise variance
giving by
λ = Q−1(Pd)
√
Eσ2i (6)
Indeed, the FC confesses the received report based on matching filter followed by a thresholding level to determine
that whether this report withstands the external attack interference power (yi) or not. This interference power aim is to
deviate the SNR (γ) from its interference-free value as
γi =
G(Si)
Pn + yi
, i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , |N | (7)
whereG denotes channel gain. Si and Pn represent transmission power of the i-th SN report and noise power, respec-
tively.
Thus, the obtained Pd or Pf actually do not reflect the real spectrum observation. Consequently, we propose a Stack-
elberg game that aims at observing the attack interference power, detecting the infected reports, and hence enhancing
the detection performance. Then, SNR is given by
γi =
G(Si + xi)
nP + yi
, i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , |N | (8)
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Therefore, the used (xi) at the equilibrium point can neglect (yi) in Eq. (7) as
γ˜i =
G(Si + x
∗
i )
Pn + y∗i
=⇒
G(Si)
n
(9)
where x∗i and y
∗
i are the optimal defense and attack budgets at the equilibrium point for the i-th report.
4 Game Formulation
In this paper, the MF detector is used in WSNs-based CR along with Stackelberg game features. To this end, in this
section, we propose a Stackelberg game model, where the competition is between the FC and the external attacker.
The attacker strategy depends on the defender (FC) strategy and vice versa. The model is developed to confront the
SSDF attack effect. More concretely, this approach concentrates on detecting the corrupted reports delivered to the
FC in WSNs-based CR. Those corrupted reports aim to deceive the FC leading to a wrong decision taken by the FC.
In fact, the attacker selects to disrupt a group of SNs reports that have an energy protection budget below a specific
thresholding level ξ. This mechanism follows the process shown in Fig. 2. It is worth mentioning that, the effect on
the performance, the relationship of the probability of detection Pd and false alarm Pf , is evaluated at the equilibrium
point.
The proposed model target is to protect the used SNs reports in the WSNs-based CR that are exploited to pinpoint
whether the spectrum is idle or busy. The game model structure is based on a sequence of actions expressed by two
players: a leader/defender (L), where (L) initiates the game, while the other player follower/attacker (F ) replies with
an action that yields to its optimal utility given the action L [27].
The utilities/payoffs functions of L and F are denoted by the UL(AL, AF ) and UF (AL, AF ), respectively, where
AL = xi and AF = yi are the individual actions taken by L and F , respectively. The leader starts with a hypothetical
actionA0L as the game assumes that L has knowledge about UF , which is utilized to withstand the attacker deceptions.
Consequently, L can determine the optimal action A∗F (A
0
L) of F Eq. (10) supposing that F is rational player, given
that A0L has been exerted. Therefore, the optimal action of L can be given by Eq. (11) [24].
A∗F (A
0
L) = argmax
AF∈A¯F
UF (A
0
L, AF ). (10)
A∗L = argmax
A0
L
∈A¯L
UL(A
0
L, argmax
AF∈A¯F
UF (A
0
L, AF )). (11)
Four definitions are now in order:
• Definition 1: The FC defense strategy is represented by DS(X), whereX is the total defense energy budget,
which is indicated by the amount of electric power invested in the defense set of actions (A¯d). The action
performed to protect i-th SN is Ax = xi, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |N |}, and the defender (FC) set of actions A¯d satisfy
constraint X ≥
∑|N |
i=1 xi. More particularly, this defense budget is used to protect the SNs reports against
the attack manipulations represented by injecting noise power to the observed signal to disrupt the delivered
report to FC.
• Definition 2: The attack strategy is indicated as AS(Y ), where Y is the total attack energy budget which is
represented by the amount of electric power invested in the attack set of actions (A¯a). The action performed to
attack i-th SN is Aa = yi = [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |N |}, and the attacker set of actions (A¯a) satisfy constraint∑N
i=1 yi ≤ Y . More concretely, this defense budget is utilized to manipulate the attacker and mitigate its
impact by countervailing the added noise power.
• Definition 3: The utilities (payoffs) functions of FC and attacker are represented by Ud(Ad) = Ud(xi) and
Ua(Aa) = Ua(yi), respectively.
• Definition 4: We can achieve subgame Nash equilibrium (NE) at (A∗d = x
∗
i ∀i) and (A
∗
a = y
∗
i ∀i) as shown
in (Appendix A). NE can be defined as a set of strategies such that none of the participants in the game
can improve their payoff, given the strategies of the other participants. In other words, NE can be explicitly
defined as no player can improve its utility by changing its action/strategy, if the other players conserve their
current actions/strategies [27].
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Algorithm 1: Proposed Stackelberg game Algorithm for SSDF attack.
1 Distribute xi;
2 Input Ad = xi, Aa = yi ;
3 while NE does not exist (more SNs reports are still infected) do
4 Compute Ui by Eq. (13), ∀i ∈ |N |;
5 Determine the malicious nodes/HW failure ;
6 if Ui < 0 then
7 if This is 1st time Ui < 0 then
8 This i-th node→ HW failure lis;
9 else
10 This i-th node→ SA malicious list;
11 end
12 end
13 if Ui > 0 then
14 This i-th node is still benevolent;
15 if Ui > ξ then
16 Add this i-th node to SL;
17 else
18 Add this i-th node to WL;
19 end
20 end
21 Sort SL and WL in ascending order based on the resulting Ui;
22 Top of heap of SS will be the strongest node (SSR);
23 if SL(2) > SL(1) then
24 Resort SS in descending till finishing all WS;
25 end
26 Defender resorts (xi)’s distribution based on Eqs. (17,18);
27 Attacker resorts (yi)’s distribution based on Eqs. (15,16);
28 Check (Ad, Aa)→ (A∗d, A
∗
a) ∀i ∈ N ;
29 Compute Ui using Eq. (13);
30 end
31 Output NE exist← ((A∗d, A
∗
a), ∀i)
The leader seeks to enhance its payoff using an appropriate A∗L given that both L and F actions have been done in
sequence. Consequently, L can accurately handle the only available action of rational F among (A¯F ) as
A∗F = argmax
AF∈A¯F
UF (A
∗
L, AF ). (12)
Therefore, subgame NE can be attained using Eqs. (10, 11, 12). It is clear that, in the examined WSNs-based CR, the
game played by the defender (FC) representing the L and the attacker acting as F . The defender aims to protect the
SNs delivered reports, while the attacker attempts to disrupt these reports. The interactions of L and F are executed
over the network lifetime.
The proposed Stackelberg game model is explicitly organized using Algorithm 1 for detecting and protecting the
WSNs-based CR from the delivered malicious SNs reports to the FC. Firstly, the FC distributes the defense budgets
(xi)’s to the deployed SNs for protecting them against the SSDF attack effect. On the other hand, the attacker allots the
corresponding attack budgets (yi)’s attempting to turning the maximum number of SNs reports into malicious. In fact,
the attacker investigates every previous action done by the FC to protect the SNs reports. When the game starts, the
utility function of the received reports (Ui) is investigated. This function denotes the difference between the defense
and attack budgets on the i-th SN report as given by
Ui = xi − yi. (13)
If Ui is less than zero, this i-th report is checked whether it is a result of a HW failure or by the SSDF effect. Otherwise,
this i-th SN report is still benevolent. More particularly, to realize the proposed model, we assume a percentage of the
SNs can suffer from a HW failure during the communication. Then, if the resulting Ui is noncontinuous negative, this
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is due a HW failure for the corresponding SN. Conversely, if the value of this Ui is continuous negative, this i-th SN
report is considered infected by the SSDF attack and will be excluded from the FC consideration.
The defense mechanism of the FC is to protect the maximum number of delivered reports leading to accurate spectrum
status decision. Consequently, the defense scheme relies on the benevolent received reports about the spectrum. Indeed,
the thresholding level (ξ), which is application sensitivity dependent, is utilized to distinguish the strongly and weakly
protected SNs reports that are sorted in strong list (SL) and weak list (WL), respectively; given that the attacker budget
is limited. The result of Eq. (13) determines the intelligent attack strategy in every new round. In this strategy, the
attacker concentrates on the weak list (WL) of the SNs reports that have been protected with low defense budgets in
the previous round. The attacker sorts the WL in a descending order based on Eq. (13) result. It means that the utility
function of those reports satisfies the following constraint
Ui = (xi − yi) < ξ. (14)
Based on the normal feature of the Stackelberg game, the leader knows the attack strategy and thus, it will apply the
same concept as the follower behaves to counter the attacker effect. Accordingly, F exerts a very little extra attack
budget α deducted from its attack budget applied on the strongest SN report (SSR) in the previous iteration to be added
to the weak SN report (WR) as
yw(SSR)|new = yw(SSR)|old − (Ur + α), (15)
yr(WR)|new = yr(WR)|old + (Ur + α). (16)
wherew is an index of a strongly protected SN, and r is an index for a weakly protected SN. This redistribution strategy
of attack budget is performed to make sure that Ur in the next iteration will be lower than zero; which compromising
the weakly protected SN report r.
In contrary, the FC manipulates the attacker by adding ξ budget value to each weak SN report that has (Ui < ξ) after
subtracting enough (ξ)’s from the strongly protected SN report (SSR) to satisfy the requirements of weak SN report in
the next iteration as given in the following equations:
xw(SSR)|new = xw(SSR)|old − (ξ). (17)
xr(WR)|new = xr(WR)|old + (ξ). (18)
Figure 3 graphically shows the mathematical induction used for the WL and SL of SNs reports leading to the NE at
which no more negative effect added by the attacker. Obviously, the green cells indicates the SL of protected SNs
reports in which SSR is the top of heap (darkest green cell). After first iteration, the FC deducts a ξ value from the
previously applied defense budget of the SSR, i.e., x(SSR) − ξ, to be re-allotted on the WL (prone to be attacked in
the next rounds). Consequently, the SL will be rearranged every subsequent iteration. The thresholding level (ξ) is the
border line between SL and WL. Then, it is followed by the yellow cells representing the list of weakly protected SNs
reports. Conversely, the attacker will add an α attack budget to the previously applied attack budget of the SSR, i.e.,
y(SSR) + α, to be redistributed on the WL. Finally, the red cells denote the malicious SNs reports.
Finally, this model makes sure that the system is reliable, given that the attacker has a limited budget. Consequently,
when we deal with pure actions/strategies where the competitive players (FC and external attacker) choose determin-
istic actions, the NE is defined here as follows:
Ui(A
∗
d, A
∗
a) ≥ Ui(Ad, A
∗
a) ∀A ∈ A, i ∈ N . (19)
5 Reports Delivery Formulation
This section explains the considered system model analysis and the reports (packets) delivery formulation. We assume
that TDMA is used for data packet transmission to prevent the possibility of collision. TDMA time slots allocations
are assigned by the FC as depicted in Fig. 4. We consider a star topology between the FC and the set of SNs observers,
N , where the number of SNs in the network is given by the cardinality of the set N which is represented by |N |.
In fact, the communication protocol between the SNs and the FC is based on transmitting a data packet from i-th SN
to the FC and then the FC replies by an acknowledgment (ACK) packet to confirm receiving the data packet. This
communication sequence is called a successful handshake.
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Figure 3: Graphical process of the mathematical induction.
The adopted path loss between every i-th SN and the FC (i, FC) is given by
PLiFC [dB] = PL0[dB] + 10nlog10
diF
d0
+ σ[dB], (20)
where PL0 is the free space path loss at the reference distance d0 of the antenna far field, n denotes the path loss
exponent, diFC is the distance between the transmitting i-th SN and the FC, and σ represents the standard deviation
in dB of the shadow fading.
The received antenna signal power at the FC from the i-th transmitting SN with power levelm can be given by
PAr,iFC(m)[dBm] = P
A
t (m)[dBm]− PLiFC [dB], (21)
where PAt (m) is the transmission antenna signal power at power level m. Table 2 illustrates the transmission power
consumption with the eight available power levels (Pct(m)) and the antenna transmission power P
A
t using Tmote Sky
node [39].
The obtained SNR for the signal power transmitted from i-th node to the FC is given by
γiFC(m)[dB] = P
A
r,iFC(m)[dBm]− Pn[dBm], (22)
where Pn is the receiver noise power. Table 3 depicts the path loss parameters for the available six environment
measurements presented in [40]. In fact, the BER based on the used SN (Tmote Sky) is given by
BER = Q
(√
2Eb
N0
)
, (23)
where EbN0 = γiFC(m)PrG, PrG denotes the process gain which is the ratio between the chip rate and the bit rate of
the spread spectrum system [39].
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Figure 4: Time diagram based on TDMA technique.
Thus, a successful packet reception probability of an uncoded L-Byte packet transmitted at power level-m among the
communicating terminals (i, FC) is given by
pSiFC(m,L) =
(
1−Q
(√
16γiFC(m)
))8L
. (24)
On the other hand, the failure probability of receiving a packet is given by
pFiFC(m,L) = 1− p
S
iFC(m,L). (25)
The probability of a successful handshake denotes the probability that a data packet is successfully transmitted from
the i-th node to the FC (pSiFC ) with power level (m) and a successfully ACK packet is responded by the FC to the i-th
SN (pSFCi) at power level (u), which is given by
pSHSiFC (m,u) = p
S
iFC(m, pkt)× p
S
FCi(u,ACK). (26)
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Table 1: Notations of parameters and variables.
Symbol Description
N The set of sensor nodes
Z The set of all nodes excluding the FC
X The total defense budget
xi Applied defense budget for i-th report
Y The total attack budget
yi Applied attack budget for i-th report
Ts Time slot duration
Tg Guard time between two consecutive time slots
Tt Transmission time duration
Tp Propagation time duration
Tb Total busy time duration
pkt Data packet length
ACK Acknowledgment packet length
D Payload length contained in a data packet
H Header length contained in a data packet
PLiFC The path loss of the link between the every i-th SN and FC
PL0
The free space path loss at the reference distance of the
antenna far field
diFC The distance between the communicating nodes i and FC
d0 The reference distance of the antenna far field
n The path loss exponent
σ The standard deviation of the shadow fading
PAr,iFC
The received signal power at the antenna of FC from
transmitting node i
PAt The transmission signal power at the transmit antenna
Pct The transmission power consumption
γ The signal-to-noise ratio
BER The bit error rate
Pn The receiver noise power
L The number of bytes per packet
PrG The process gain
PS The probability of successful packet reception
PF The probability of failure packet reception
PSHS The probability of successful handshake
PFHS The probability of failure handshake
Re
The probability of re-transmission to achieve successful
handshake
Edt The energy dissipation for transmitting a packet
Edpp The energy dissipation for processing a packet
EHSt The total energy dissipation
TA The data acquisition time duration
m A transmit energy level of the data packet
u A transmit energy level of the ACK packet
Poff The power consumption during sleep mode
B The total energy of the sensor node battery
EDA The energy dissipation due to data acuasition per round
PDA The power dissipation due to data acuasition
TDA The data acquisition time
Pcr The power consumption due to data reception
Consequently, the probability of failure handshake is given by
pFHSiFC (m,u) = 1− p
SHS
iFC (m,u). (27)
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Table 2: Consumed transmission power Pct and antenna output power P
A
t with every power levelm [39].
Pct (mW) P
A
t (dBm) m Pct (mW) P
A
t (dBm) m
25.5 -25 3 41.7 -5 19
29.7 -15 7 45.6 -3 23
33.6 -10 11 49.5 -1 27
37.5 -7 15 52.2 0 31
Table 3: Path loss parameters for the six environments [40].
Environment n σ(dB) Pn(dBm)
Outdoor-LOS (OL) 2.42 3.12 -93
Outdoor-NLOS (ON) 3.51 2.95 -93
Underground-LOS (UL) 1.45 2.45 -92
Underground-NLOS (UN) 3.15 3.19 -92
Indoor-LOS (IL) 1.64 3.29 -88
Indoor-NLOS (IN) 2.38 2.25 -88
Clearly, the data packets should be re-transmitted (ReiFC(m,u)) times to ensure that the data packets are successfully
transmitted. The number of re-transmissions is given by
ReiFC(m,u) =
1
pSHSiFC (m,u)
. (28)
Energy dissipation for transmitting a (pkt)-Byte packet from the i-th SN to the FC with power level (m) is given by
Edt(m, pkt) = Pct(m)Tpkt, (29)
Indeed, when a SN accomplishes the packet transmission, it stays in the receive mode during the time slot. Therefore,
this situation should be taken into consideration at calculating the total energy dissipation as
EHSt (m, pkt) = Edt(m, pkt) + Pcr(Ts − Tpkt), (30)
where Pcr represents the power consumption of the data reception during the rest of the time slot, Ts is the slot time,
and Tpkt represents the actual packet transmission time. Furthermore, the energy consumed for packet processing and
for re-transmission until attaining successful handshake is given by
Edt(m,u) = Edpp +Reij(m,u)E
HS
t (m, pkt), (31)
where Edpp is the energy dissipation for packet processing, which is computed only once when successful handshake
exists. On the other hand, the successful handshake energy dissipation at the receiver side, ESHSr (u,ACK), consists
of the energy consumed for receiving the data packet and the energy consumed for transmitting ACK to the transmitter.
Thus, ESHSr (u,ACK) is given by
ESHSr (u,ACK) = Pcr(Ts − TACK) + E
ACK
t (u,ACK). (32)
Conversely, the energy dissipation of failed handshake due to the absence of data packet is given by
EFHSr = PcrTs. (33)
Consequently, the total energy dissipation at the receiver taking into account all data packets re-transmissions and
ACK packets re-transmissions is given by
ESHSr,FCi(m,u) = Edpp +ReiFC(m,u)[p
SHS
iFC (m,u)×
ESHSr (u,ACK) + p
S
iFC(m, pkt)×
pFFCi(u,ACK)E
SHS
r (u,ACK)
+ pFiFC(m, pkt)E
FHS
r ].
(34)
It should be noted that if a SN is not busy during a specific time slot it stays in the sleep mode, wherein the power
consumption is Poff .
12
Employing Game Theory and TDMA Protocol to Enhance Security and Manage Power Consumption in
WSNs-based Cognitive Radio A PREPRINT
6 Simulation Results
This section presents the simulation results. The simulation parameters are presented in Table 4. We assume Tmode
Sky [40, 41] as a realistic SN model and employ the parameters from the data sheet in [39]. We assumed that all SNs
use power level m = 31. It is worth mentioning that, the number of generated pkts by every SN per round depends
on the selectedD. For instant, ifD equals 120 bytes, only one data packet will be generated by every SN. IfD equals
60, two data packets will be generated. We use four different total attack budgets Y ∈ {8, 10, 13, 17} for model
verification and Y = {8, 17} for showing the WSNs-based CR performance using Eqs. (4,5) (Pd vs. Pf )) and (Pd
vs. SNR)) with the same FC defense budgetX = 20. In addition, the FC decision is affected by the observed signal
level at the SNs over an AWGN channel taking into consideration the shadowing fading. It is assumed that all SNs are
located from the FC with the maximum coverage range of the Tmote Sky SN (125 m) to show the effectiveness of our
model. Although the maximum distance is used, the model operates efficiently along with MF detector and TDMA
over the six environments (OL, ON, UL, UN, IL, and IN).
Figure 5 shows the percentage of benevolent SNs reports that withstand the attack manipulations among the total num-
ber of reports with the proposed defense mechanism, random defense scheme (the defense power budget is randomly
allotted for the SNs) and equal (Eq.) weight defense schemes (the defense budgets are equally weighted distributed for
the SNs) within 20 rounds. The percentages of protected SNs reports are about (83%, 74%, 70%, and 58%) due to the
applied attack budgets (8, 10, 13, and 17), respectively. Meanwhile, the protected reports percentage steeply degraded
while using the random or the equal protection mechanisms. Therefore, it can be estimated from the obtained results
that the proposed model achieves efficient protection against the SSDF effect.
The resulting utility functions of the SNs reports due to the proposed attack-defense strategy are shown in Fig. 6. The
results indicate the benevolent reports after first round, the reports confronted the attack till the end of simulation, and
the ones that turned malicious due to the attack effect, which are colored by yellow bars, green bars, and red bars,
respectively. The results prove the success of the proposed model in protecting the majority of reports against the
intellectual attack manipulations.
Figure 7 indicates that our model along with the MF outperforms the work in [24] in which energy detection (ED)
method was used, hard decision rule (HDR) and soft decision rule (SDR). We have shown the results when (Y = 13)
where in the obtained simulations our model presents better performance even with the other values of attack budget
Y ∈ {8, 10, 17} over all the six environments. It is worth mentioning that, here, we only show the comparison when
ON environment is utilized to indicate the effectiveness of the proposed model with MF among the work done in [24]
even in the harsh environment.
Then, the relationship between Pd and SNR has been extensively studied in two PU cases (nonfluctuating and fluctu-
ating). The obtained results in both cases depict the improved performancewhether with fluctuating or non-fluctuating
PU as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, respectively. Moreover, we found that changing the environment does not affect the
relationship between Pd and SNR. Note that, in all simulations done the proposed model presents better performance
(Pd vs. SNR) as compared to random (rand) and equal (Eq.) weight defense strategies regardless the attack budget
value. Therefore, we only show two samples when Y = {8, 17}, which represent the minimum and maximum used
attack budgets, respectively.
After that, we have selected the maximumattack budget as an indicator of the effectiveness of our model to compare the
nonfluctuating (Nonfluct.) and fluctuating (Fluct.) PU obtained curves showing the difference between the proposed
model along with MF and without attack attempt applied as shown in Fig. 10. It is clearly shown that the obtained
Table 4: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
|N | 50 Tg = Tp 100mus [42]
Pcr 69 mW Ts 4.78 ms
PDA 11.4 mW Data rate 250 Kb/s
TDA 5 ms Tpkt
pkt
Datarate
EDA muJ TACK
ACK
Datarate
D 120 bytes PrG
2Mchip/s
Datarate [39, 43]
H 8 bytes Poff 3muW
ACK 12 bytes Edpp 12.66muJ
m 31 B 15 KJ
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results of the proposed mode is very close to that scenario of without attack. This definitely means that the proposed
model with MF can handle the SSDF attack manipulations.
Afterward, the indication of the proposed model on improving the number of correctly packets (protected reports) to
be processed by the FC and taking the decision based on is shown in Fig. 11. We have compared our model to the
case of no attack exists and both rand and Eq. weight defense strategies over the best environment (UL) and worse
environments (ON) when the attack budget is minimum and maximum (Y = {8, 17}). The results ensures the power
of the proposed model with MF for confronting the SSDF attack as compared to without attack scenario and definitely
with rand and Eq. weight defense strategies. It is clearly shown that the obtained results based on the proposed
Stackelberg game model along with MF achieves very close number of packets to be protected to that scenario of no
attack whether the attack budget is minimum (Y = 8) or maximum (Y = 17).
Similarly, the lost non-beneficial battery energy of the FC due to consecutive negative feedback (ACK) transmitted
to the SNs that its report is infected is shown in Fig. 12. We can figure out that the FC battery life time can be
maliciously exhausted when the SNs are not effectively protected. It is clear that the harsh environment (ON) adds an
extra negative impact plus the attack budget on losing the packets or interfering them which means negative ACK will
be sent to those SNs that their packets are affected by the fading problem. Therefore, the results of ON environment
get worse as compared to the ones of UL. Moreover, the scenario is more worse when Y increases. Among the
extensive obtained simulation results, we show the results when the attack budget equals (Y = {8, 17}) representing
the minimum and maximum designated attack budgets, respectively.
Figure 13 shows the presented study on the fluctuating PU performance (Pd vs. Pf ) over the six environments OL,
ON, UL, UN, IL, and IN, respectively. Obviously, the results obtained are close to each other. It is clearly shown that,
both OL, UL, and IL environments represents very close perfect performance. The ON environment presents the worst
performance as compared to the other environments results because of being a harsh environment. This is a result of
being the ON possesses the highest path loss exponent, which owns much more impact on the path loss, among the
other environments. However, it is still a feasible performance.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an effective attack-defense strategy based on the Stackelberg game along with MF to
alleviate the problem of corrupted SNs reports delivered at FC in WSNs-based CR over different six communication
environments in which the data transmission is organized by TDMA technique. Moreover, TDMA is adopted to handle
the complexity of MF along with the proposed model and to avoid the delivered reports collision. We also considered
a realistic scenario of the SNs HW failure. However, the proposed model can detect this malfunction. Based on the
obtained simulation results, the proposed model achieves effective protection against the SSDF malicious attack ef-
fect. In addition, the proposed approach protects about 83% of the total number of SNs reports at the presence of the
intelligent attack manipulations. Moreover, equilibrium can be achieved with minimal number of rounds. Therefore,
the detection performance has been improved for our proposed approach, leading to an almost error-free spectrum
access against the SSDF attack impact under the simulated scenarios. Furthermore, the number of packets that are cor-
rectly received by FC from the deployed SNs are promoted and the lost non-beneficial energy due to the attack impact
has been managed. Consequently, the proposed Stackelberg game model, among the intelligent and adaptive game-
theoretic approaches, along with MF and TDMA strictly prove beneficial for improving spectrum sensing, mitigating
security threats, enhancing data privacy, and managing the power consumption in WSNs-based CR.
APPENDIX A
Table 5: Action matrix of the proposed Stackelberg game.
Attack actions
Actions sequence 1 2 · · · · · · · · · |N |
FC
actions
1 x1, y1 x2, y2 · · · xγ−1, yγ−1 xγ+1, yγ+1 · · · · · · x|N|, y|N|
2 x
′
1, y
′
1 x2, y2 · · · xγ−1, yγ−1 xγ+1, yγ+1 · · · · · · x|N|, y|N|
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
... x
′
1, y
′
1 x
′
2, y
′
2 + α · · · xγ−1, yγ−1 xγ+1, yγ+1 · · · · · · x|N|, y|N|
... x
′
1, y
′
1 x
′
2, y
′
2 · · · x
′
γ−1, y
′
γ−1 + α xγ+1, yγ+1 · · · · · · x|N|, y|N|
|N | x
′
1, y
′
1 x2, y2 · · · xγ−1, yγ−1 x
′
γ , y
′
γ x
′
γ+1, y
′
γ+1 + α · · · x|N|, y|N|
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Figure 5: The ratio of delivered reports among the total number of delivered reports
∵ Attack strategy AS =
y1, y2, · · · , y|N | = αx1, αx2, · · · , αx|N |
∵ the attacker benefit is maximized based on redistributing its budget from yr to yq to manipulate the defender, where
(r 6= q).
y1, y2, · · · , yr − φ, yq + α, · · · , y|N |,
where the attacker deducts an attack budget α from the strong protected CM and add that to the weak protected CM.
∵ The alternative attack by redistributing its budget and sorting those CMs in a descending order based on the previous
status of the utility functions is denoted as
ASA = y
′
1, y
′
2, · · · , y
′
|N | (35)
∵ The redistribution of the AS is denoted as Dαr,q.
∴ any ASA can be represented by a redistribution sequence budget |N | − 1 from the optimal attack strategy (AS∗) as
Dα11,2, D
α2
2,3, · · · , D
α|N|−1
|N |−1,|N |
Assume the budget redistribution from ASA =⇒ AS∗ as
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Figure 7: Pd vs. Pf comparison of the proposed model and the corresponding in the literature, Y = 13.
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Figure 8: Pd vs. SNR comparison of the proposed model to random and equal weight defense strategies with
nonfluctuating PU, Y = {8, 17}.
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Figure 9: Pd vs. SNR comparison of the proposed model to random and equal weight defense strategies with
fluctuating PU, Y = {8, 17}.
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D(1), D(2), · · · , D(N − 1)
∵ The mathematical induction with respect to heuristic concept is utilized by α-th redistribution for the i-th CM (Ui)
in the (WL) depending on the first node (SCM) as
U1 = (y1 − L · α)− x1, (36)
where L>R is the subtracted number of (α)’s from the strongest report budget given that the strongest report is the top
of heap of the (SL). More specifically, U1 > U2.
AS∗ = max Ua ∀i = (1, 2, · · · , |N |) (37)
Ui
SL
>
<
WL
γ, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |N |). (38)
To check the availability of finding ASA > AS
∗
Uai > Udi|i /∈WL or SL (39)
∵ The attacker concentrates onWL.
∴ There is no ASA satisfies Ua > Ud ∀i as illustrated below using the chain budget redistribution.
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Figure 11: Number of correctly processed packets of the proposed model vs. rand and Eq. weight defense strategies
based on (UL) and (ON) environments, Y = {8, 17}.
AS∗ =y1, y2, · · · , yγ−1, yγ+1, · · · , y|N |
D1,2 ⇓
y
′
1, y2 + α, · · · , yγ−1, yγ+1, · · · , y|N |
D2,3 ⇓
y
′
1, y
′
2, · · · , yγ−1, yγ+1, · · · , y|N |
...
Dγ−1+α,γ ⇓
y
′
1, y
′
2, · · · , yγ−1+α, yγ , yγ+1, · · · , y|N |
∴ the action matrix leading to the NE presented in Eq. 19 is given by Table 5.
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